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Abstract
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, which are a major threat on the Internet, have recently become more
sophisticated as a result of their ability to exploit application-layer vulnerabilities. Most defense methods are
designed for detecting DDoS attacks on IP and TCP layers and consequently have difficulty in detecting this new
type of DDoS attack. With the profiling of web browsing behavior, the sequence order of web page requests can
be used for detecting the application-layer DDoS (App-DDoS) attacks. However, the sequence order may be more
harmful than helpful in the profiling of web browsing behaviors because it varies significantly for different
individuals and different browsing behaviors. This article introduces a sequence-order-independent method for the
profiling of network traffic and the detection of a new type of App-DDoS attacks. Four attributes are extracted
from web page request sequences without consideration of the sequence order of requested pages. A model
based on the multiple principal component analysis is proposed for the profiling of normal web browsing
behaviors, and its reconstruction error is used as a criterion for detecting DDoS attacks. The proposed method is
experimentally confirmed with various types of new App-DDoS attacks.
1. Introduction
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks have
become a major threat and one of the hardest problems
to overcome on the Internet. Various activities, such as
telecommunication, online banking, and online shop-
ping, have recently been integrated through the Internet,
yet the Internet is now plagued by more than 10 million
infected hosts (or zombies) [1]. DDoS attacks have con-
sequently become a serious threat.
DDoS attacks traditionally exploit the vulnerabilities of
a network layer, particularly SYN flooding, UDP flood-
ing, and ICMP flooding. These attacks exhaust the net-
work bandwidth and resources of the victim; so that
legitimate access is denied. Although many studies have
developed defense methods, sophisticated DDoS attacks
can now overcome these methods.
One recent sophisticated DDoS attack is called an
application-layer DDoS (App-DDoS) attack [2]. Unlike
conventional DDoS attacks, this type of attacks exploits
vulnerabilities at the application layer rather than at the
network layer. App-DDoS attacks send small packets of
legitimate content via normal successful TCP connec-
tions; no spoofed IP address with standard services such
as HTTP and HTTPS. Thus, the DDoS defensive meth-
ods mistakenly regard App-DDoS attacks as normal
connections. Furthermore, App-DDoS attacks are simi-
lar to a flash crowd event, which happens when massive
numbers of normal users simultaneously send requests
to one web server [3]. Hence, it is difficult to distinguish
App-DDoS attacks from legitimate normal traffic.
There are several DDoS defense methods that utilize
application-layer information. Ranjan et al. [4] analyzed
time-related characteristics of HTTP sessions, such as
session inter-arrival time, request inter-arrival time, and
session arrival time. Yatagai et al. [5] presented a
method that analyzes the correlation between browsing
time and page information size. However, time-related
features are insufficient to detect App-DDoS attacks
because attackers can easily control packet-sending rates
by utilizing a large-scale botnet [6]. On the other hand,
Kandula et al. [7] developed a system that protects a
web server from DDoS attacks by implementing a prob-
abilistic authentication method using CAPTCHAs, but
the task of requiring users to solve graphic puzzles
causes additional service delays. As a result, the graphic
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puzzles cause annoying legitimate users as well as act as
another DDoS attack point.
For the detection of App-DDoS attacks, Xie et al. [8]
used a hidden semi-Markov model (HsMM) to describe
the normal browsing behavior of web users. The HsMM
uses the sequence order of web page requests to profile
normal web browsing behavior. To detect App-DDoS
attacks, they defined a normality threshold and com-
pared it with the model’s output values of incoming
users. However, the sequence-order-based method can
be complex and may cause many false alarms. The
sequence order might vary significantly for different
individuals and for different browsing behaviors. For
example, web users can directly type URLs to request
resources or utilize external web links. Furthermore,
they can browse the resources of the web server with
multiple browsers, possibly causing changes in the rela-
tive sequential positions.
In this article, we propose a sequence-order-indepen-
dent method that distinguishes App-DDoS attacks from
normal traffic. We regard the sequence order as a kind of
noise rather than good information. We first extract the
sequence-order-independent informative attributes from
web page request sequences; these attributes represent a
web user’s activeness, pages of interest, and the breadth
and intensity of their interest. We describe them in a
matrix and use multiple principal component analysis
(PCA) to model the browsing patterns. We then use the
reconstruction error of the multiple PCA as a criterion
for distinguishing App-DDoS attacks from normal usage.
This article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
describe App-DDoS attacks. In Section 3, we propose a
new App-DDoS detection method that includes new
sequence-order-independent attributes and a multiple
PCA model. In Section 4, we validate our detection
model with real traffic and discuss an early warning sys-
tem. Finally, in Section 5, we present our conclusions.
2. App-DDoS Attacks
App-DDoS attacks exploit victim servers by exhausting
the resources such as sockets, CPU, memory, and disk
bandwidth. According to [9], server resources may
become the bottleneck of the Internet applications.
App-DDoS attacks are also launched on mobile devices,
such as smart-phones and ubiquitous sensors, because
they require few resources in the client side. Thus, App-
DDoS attacks cause more serious problems than in the
past.
Figure 1 shows an example of an App-DDoS attack.
The attacker first exploits a popular web server, the
worm distribution server, to insert malicious codes. It
causes web users to download malicious codes and
makes their hosts become infected. When the attacker
begins an attack via the command server, an excessive
number of infected hosts make requests for web pages
from the victim; as a result, the victim’s resources are
eventually exhausted.
One of the differences between conventional DDoS
and App-DDoS attacks is that App-DDoS attacks utilize
only legitimate methods instead of vulnerabilities of pro-
tocols. App-DDoS attacks usually send small packets via
successful TCP connections, and real IP addresses thus
are used to launch attacks. In particular, App-DDoS
attacks send packets through standard services such as
HTTP and HTTPS. Moreover, these packets are gener-
ated with various sending rates to mimic legitimate
users. Thus, these application-layer requests are indistin-
guishable from those generated by legitimate users.
3. Proposed method
In this section, we propose a defensive method that can
be used for detecting an App-DDoS attack. We show
how to represent a set of web browsing behaviors using
sequence-order-independent attributes instead of web
page request sequences. We then present a multiple
Figure 1 App-DDoS attack.
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PCA model to profile normal web browsing patterns
and distinguish App-DDoS attacks. Since DDoS attack
detection systems are required to handle an extremely
large volume of traffic, we base our description of the
web browsing patterns on PCA instead of nonlinear
methods such as kernel methods and manifold learning
[10,11].
3.1. Sequence-order-independent attributes
We represent each request sequence as a vector form of
extracted attributes. Let us assume that N users browsed
a web server where the total number of web pages is D.
For user i who browsed this server, let si be the web
page request sequence and hd, i be the number of








Li/N is the average number of requests
of users.
Now, let us define several sequence-order-independent
attributes for detecting App-DDoS attacks. To give a
clearer representation of active user i, we introduce the
attribute
τi = Li/L¯, (1)
which is the ratio of the number of requests of a user
and their average value. The next attribute,
hd,i = ηd,i/Li, (2)
is the proportion of page d among pages requested by
user i; it shows how much user i was interested in page
d of the server.
To help determine whether incoming users are indica-
tive of a DDoS attack, we supplement the two basic
attributes with two other attributes that characterize the
web browsing patterns of a user. The first supplemen-
tary attribute is defined as the proportion of all server





where bd, i is an indicator that equals 1 if hd, i > and 0
otherwise. This attribute represents the breadth of user
i’s interest.
The next supplementary attribute shows the intensity
of interest in the user’s page of greatest interest. This
attribute for user i can be defined by using qi = argmaxd
{hd, i} to denote the most frequently requested page.
Thus, the intensity of the user’s interest in the page of
greatest interest can be represented as follows by the
ratio of the number of requests for the page of greatest
interest and the number of page requests:
γi = ηqi,i/Li. (4)
From these attributes, we denote a attribute vector as
wi = [hi, ai, τi, gi]
T, where hi = [h1,i, h2,i,...,hD, i]
T. We
then form the attribute matrix W = [w1...wN].
3.2. PCA for web browsing behaviors
PCA is the simplest statistical method for transforming
given data to new coordinates called principal compo-
nents. By removing less important components, it can
reduce the number of dimensions required to explain
the given data. The reduced subspace best represents
the given data in a least-squares sense.
We use PCA to model web browsing patterns; the
modeling is based solely on normal users’ attributes. To
model the web browsing patterns, we first denote a






N, , and C = XXT/N, where X = [xi...
xN], xi = wi - μ0, and i = 1,...,N. We then compute the
eigenvectors and eigenvalues by applying singular value
decomposition to the covariance matrix.
If we let uj be the jth most significant eigenvector of
covariance matrix C, then the significant principal com-
ponents are denoted by U˜ =
[
u1 . . . up
]
, where P (≪ D)
is the number of significant principal components. Since
the remaining eigenvectors [uP+1...uD+3] are less signifi-
cant, we can reduce the dimensions of the data without
significant loss when these eigenvectors are discarded.
If the attribute vectors are projected into the subspace
spanned by P significant principal components, then we
can represent the attribute of web user i in terms of the
following P-dimensional coefficient vector:
ai = U˜Txi, i = 1, . . . ,N (5)
This coefficient indicates how much each principal
component contributes to the representation of the
given attribute.
3.3. Multiple PCA model
Describing real traffic via a single PCA model is difficult
because the traffic data usually include many patterns,
variations, and different types of noise. We therefore
propose to use a multiple form of PCA for effective
modeling of real traffic. For the multiple PCA model,
we use the k-means clustering method to partition the
given data into several clusters [12]. The k-means clus-
tering is a well-known algorithm for unsupervised clus-
tering, but is inappropriate for sparse or concave-shaped
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data [13,14]. With our attributes, it is frequently the
case that a particular data element may remain zero
because some web pages may not be requested for a
long period. Accordingly, our attribute matrix may have
a high degree of sparsity. To overcome this problem, we
perform k-means clustering on the values of the PCA
coefficient, ai, instead of the values of the raw data, wi.
Because the ai values are low-dimensional and not
sparse, we can easily partition the given attributes into
several clusters with the coefficient.
Next, we build a PCA model on each cluster. Let wi
(k)
be user i’s attribute vector that belongs to cluster k. For
each cluster, we first normalize the attribute vector by xi
(k) = (wi
(k) - μ(k))/(s (k))2, where μ(k) and (s (k))2 are the
mean and variance vectors for cluster k, respectively.
We then compute P-significant principal components, U
(k), for cluster k as described in the previous section.
Once the principal components of cluster k are com-
puted, we can reconstruct the original attribute vector
with only P principal components. The reconstructed











Designed exclusively for normal traffic, our PCA
model produces a good representation of the attributes
of normal traffic but a poor representation of the attri-
butes of unseen traffic. As a result, the reconstruction
error is low for normal behavior but high for abnormal.
We regard the high reconstruction errors of the PCA
as statistical outliers. Hence, we choose a threshold, δ(k),
of cluster k and use it as follows to determine whether
the given web browsing behavior is normal:




ε − E[ε]]2, (8)
where E[ε] and E[ε - E[ε]]2 are the mean and variance
of the reconstruction errors for model k, respectively.
The b value is a scale factor for defining the outlier
range. According to studies on outlier detection, the
outlier range should deviate from the mean by more
than two or three standard deviations [15].
3.4. Detection method
If a new web user, t, requests a web page from the ser-
ver, then we first form attribute vector wt and determine






where k = 1,...,K. The value K is the total number of
clusters, and mk is the mean of the PCA coefficients for
cluster k. After selecting the best fitting model, π, we
normalize wt using μ
(π) and s(π). Finally, the model com-
pares the reconstruction error, εt, with the error thresh-
old, δ(π). If εt >δ
(π), then the model regards the current
user as an App-DDoS attack. Figures 2 and 3 show the
pseudocodes of the proposed method, which includes
model training and testing.
4. Experimental results and analysis
4.1. Datasets
To validate our App-DDoS attack defense method, we
used the web-logs from real websites: an educational
website, a community website, and an online shopping
website. In the educational website, students frequently
request some parts of webpages which include educa-
tional information. In the community website, users
repeatedly request the same webpage which can show
different contents using server scripts, such as PHP and
ASP. In the online shopping website, customers widely
search for their interesting items and wander aimlessly
with multiple browsers. We extracted host IPs, request
times, and requested webpages from the web-logs, and
then constructed sequence datasets; including 30140,
26727, and 99018 sequences. The characteristics of data-
sets are shown in Table 1. We randomly selected half of
the normal sequences to train the model, and for the
testing, we used the remainder of the normal sequences
as well as the attack sequences. To reliably validate our
detection model, we repeated all our experiments with
20 different random seeds.
Figure 2 Pseudocode for the training phase of the proposed
model.
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4.2. App-DDoS attacks
To validate our detection model, we performed experi-
ments with three types of attacks. Most studies on App-
DDoS attacks restrict their experiments to random page
attacks, which involve requests for randomly selected
pages from the web server. Random page attacks can be
easily detected by defense methods because their pat-
terns are quite different from the behavior of a normal
user. However, as mentioned, DDoS attackers have
become more sophisticated and now tend to mimic the
normal user behavior. Our experiments therefore
include additional types of attacks that mimic the pat-
terns of normal users, particularly main page attacks
and dominant page attacks. A main page attack repeat-
edly requests the main page, which is the page most fre-
quently requested by users; a dominant page attack
randomly requests any of the pages frequently requested
by most users.
For the App-DDoS attack datasets, we initiated App-
DDoS attacks on a web server featured in other studies
[4,5,8]. The attack traffic was generated in a network of
the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and
Technology (KAIST) via a modification of black energy,
which is a well-known DDoS attack tool. We con-
structed copies of websites in the KAIST network as tar-
get systems of the attacks because of security problems.
During the course of the App-DDoS attacks, we col-
lected web logs from the web server and extracted web
page request sequences. The collected sequences include
9,492 main page attacks, 14,038 random page attacks,
and 9,489 dominant page attacks.
4.3. Results and analysis
To construct our App-DDoS defense model, we first
projected the proposed attribute matrix into a subspace
spanned by the initial principal components, U˜ , because
it was highly sparse matrix. Then, we partitioned the
data into several groups by k-means clustering based on
the initial PCA coefficients. The parameter k was initi-
ally set to a sufficiently large number (k = 100) and clus-
ters were merged if similar. Then, we constructed the
multiple PCA models. We used seven principal compo-
nents with the consideration of complexity and overfit-
ting problems [15]; however, it could be adjusted as
needed.
In this section, the performance of App-DDoS defense
methods is illustrated with several sets of results. We
first confirm whether the proposed attributes give good
information to discriminate App-DDoS attacks or not.
Figure 4 shows the results of the measurement for ai, τi,
and gi. In this figure, the measured values for normal
traffic are shown in first row, and those of attacks are
shown in second row. In Figure 5, the values for the hi
are also plotted. It is noted that the dimension reduction
is applied for visualizing a multi-dimensional vector, hi.
We can see the differences between normal traffic and
attacks in term of these values. Hence, we regard these
values as important attributes even though they discard
sequence-ordered information.
The proposed method discriminates App-DDoS
attacks based on the reconstruction errors of the PCA.
Thus, we show the reconstruction errors of a model, k,
as shown in Figure 6. Here, the dots and the circles
indicate the reconstruction errors of normal traffic for
training data and validation data, and the axes indicate
those of attack traffic for test data. Since our principal
components are obtained to represent only normal traf-
fic, the reconstruction errors for normal traffic are natu-
rally low. On the contrary, the reconstruction errors for
attack traffic are much higher than those of normal traf-
fic. It is noted that some high values of this figure are
set to 70 so as to visualize them.
We compared our method with a sequence-order-
based defense method on the standard metrics such as
the detection rate (DR), false positive rate (FPR), and
Figure 3 Pseudocode for the testing phase of the proposed
model.
Table 1 Characteristics of sequence datasets
Dataset Type of site #Seq. Avg.
seq.
Characteristics
Dataset1 Education 30140 13.03 Requests for mostly
dominant pages




99018 22.7 Links to most of pages
Requests for a variety of
pages
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receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves. For that
reason, we constructed a sequence-order-based defense
method, which is modeled by the HsMM [8]. Webpage
sequences for the HsMM were extracted from our
weblogs. The best parameters were selected after experi-
ments with a variety of parameters were conducted;
initial parameters such as prior probabilities, transition
matrix, and observation matrix were randomly set.
For the purpose of comparison, we first conducted
experiments on various decision thresholds. The DR
and the FPR were measured on each dataset and aver-
aged. Table 2 shows the results of the experiment. As
the threshold became large, the models yielded a rela-
tively low DR and a low FPR, and vice versa. Our
method tended to detect more App-DDoS attacks on all
thresholds but its FPR was slightly higher than that of
the HsMM. Figure 7 shows the ROC curves comparing
our method and the HsMM. In this figure, we can see
that the DR of our method is higher than that of the
HsMM at most FPRs. When we carefully take into
Figure 4 Values of the proposed attributes for normal and attack connections: the ai (a), the τi (b) and the gi (c) of normal are shown
in the first row; the ai (d), the τi (e), and the gi (f) of attacks are shown in the second row.
Figure 5 Plot of the hi for normal and attack connections after
dimension reduction. Figure 6 Plots of PCA coefficients in the model k.
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account the DR, the FPR, and ROC curves, the thresh-
old can be set between μ + 2s and μ + 3s. This result
is the same as that of studies based on outlier detection:
the thresholds are usually set to two or three standard
deviations from the mean [16]. In this experiment, our
detection model has a DR of 86.7% and an FPR of 4.5%
for a threshold of μ + 2.5s, and the HsMM has a DR of
74.3% and an FPR of 5.4% for a threshold of μ + 2s.
As previously mentioned, we performed experiments
with three types of App-DDoS attacks. The DRs for
each type of attack are shown in Table 3. Performance
evaluations were conducted on each dataset because
browsing behaviors can be different for different web-
sites. As we expected, random page attacks tend to be
detected well by defensive methods and the dominant
page attacks tend to be detected less. We can see that
our method outperforms the HsMM in most cases. The
HsMM shows good performance for random page
attacks but poor performance for main page and domi-
nant page attacks. This means that random page attacks
generate disordered sequences, while other attacks gen-
erate natural sequences by mimicking normal behaviors.
In addition, as shown in dataset3 of this table, we can
find that sequence orders can be broken in complicated
websites that have a lot of hyper links. On the other
hand, our method can detect the attacks better than the
HsMM. One of the reasons is that we utilize specific
numerical values for detecting App-DDoS attacks and
we employ the divide and conquer approach.
One of the advantages of our detection method is to
enable additional information to be easily inserted into
the model. For the purpose of adding attributes, our
method can use any types of numerical attributes, while
the HsMM requires only types of ordered data. Thus,
network experts’ opinions can easily be applied to our
method for improving the detection performance. For
example, it was difficult to detect main page attacks on
the community website because the same page was also
repeatedly requested by normal users. In this case, we
can utilize information about the HTTP status codes
and parameters of server scripts. Thus, we extracted this
information from weblogs and simply attached two
additional values to the attribute vector: v1 = ei/Li and
v2 = pi/Li, where the ei is the number of requests whose
status code includes an error (i.e., 404 Not Found) in a
sequence i. The value pi is the number of the pages that
include the same script parameters (i.e., “id = 1”) in a
sequence i. Figure 8 shows the results of measurement
for normal traffic and attacks. The main page attack
includes three types of script parameter patterns: (1) no
script parameter, (2) random script parameters, and (3)
increasing script parameters. Adding new attributes
helps improving the DR for the main page attacks. For
main page attacks on dataset2, the DR is originally
49.1% but we can achieve a DR of 83.7% as shown in
Table 3 after attaching two new attributes into the attri-
bute vector.
4.4. Early warning system
The proposed method can be used as an early warning
system. A detection method that utilizes sequences
should determine the sequence length at which the algo-
rithm is launched. The general principle for determining
the sequence length is as follows: the shorter the
sequence, the earlier the response–albeit with less relia-
bility. Figure 9 shows the average reconstruction errors
as the sequence length varies. The reconstruction error
for legitimate users remains at a certain level whereas
Table 2 Averaged performances of the methods for
various error thresholds
Proposed HsMM
Threshold DR(%) FPR(%) DR(%) FPR(%)
μ + s 95.4 20.9 89.9 14.7
μ + 1.5s 94.3 11.8 83.8 7.8
μ + 2s 91.4 9.1 74.3 5.4
μ + 2.5s 86.7 4.5 64.3 3.4
μ + 3s 83.8 4.0 38.5 1.7
μ + 3.5s 77.0 3.2 33.7 0.5
Figure 7 Comparison of ROC curves.
Table 3 DRs of the proposed method (Prop.) and the
HsMM on various datasets
Attack type Dataset1 Dataset2 Dataset3
Prop. HsMM Prop. HsMM Prop. HsMM
Main page 92.3 85.5 83.7 48.3 90.5 84.2
Random page 95.5 98.1 97.2 99.8 82.9 68.7
Dominant page 86.1 65.5 82.5 67.2 69.5 51.6
Average 91.3 83.0 87.8 71.7 80.9 68.1
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the error for attacks becomes large as the sequence
length varies from short to long. Therefore, if the DDoS
detection model is launched with an appropriately short
sequence length, the model can act as an early warning
system. Although the proposed model may make incor-
rect decisions, it gradually refines its decisions as
enough requests are obtained.
5. Conclusion
The focus of this article is on detecting App-DDoS
attacks. We proposed a new model that utilizes
sequence-order-independent attributes rather than the
web page sequence order. The model consists of multi-
ple PCAs so that complex browsing behaviors are given
maximal consideration. Requiring only the weblog and
the simplest of computations, the proposed method is
practical and efficient for detecting App-DDoS attacks
in real environments. To reliably validate our model, we
generated three types of App-DDoS attacks. Our
method detects App-DDoS attacks with an averaged DR
of 86.7% and an averaged FPR of 4.5% when the error
threshold is set at μ + 2.5s. These values demonstrate
Figure 8 Plots of additional attributes: the v1 (a) and the v2 (b) of normal traffic are shown in the first row; the v1 (c) and the v2 (d) of
attacks are shown in the second row.
Figure 9 Reconstruction errors in relation to the sequence length.
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that the proposed method can effectively describe a web
user’s browsing behavior and detect App-DDoS attacks.
In addition, the proposed model has the capability of
acting as an early warning system. Future research will
focus on efficient updates and automatic learning algo-
rithms, so that we can develop a defense method with
online updates.
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